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責任あるゲーム利用

OG.Dexsport

On July 13, 2026, Trump announced the United States would reinstate its naval blockade of Iran, targeting Iranian ships and customers.

This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States government, or an authorized representative of the United States government, publicly and officially announces the end, termination, lifting, or suspension of the United States’ naval blockade on Iranian ships and ships of Iranian customers, between market creation and the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.

An announcement qualifies if it communicates that the United States will generally cease blocking vessel traffic for Iranian ships and customers, including an announcement that the blockade will not take effect at all, even if some restrictions remain (for example, an imposition of fees). An announcement does not qualify if it reflects only a limited or partial change that stops short of a general end or suspension of the blockade, for example, an exemption for a specific vessel, cargo, or port.

A qualifying announcement must be a declarative statement of the United States government’s present termination or suspension of the blockade, previously-unannounced prior termination or suspension of the blockade, or definitive decision to terminate or suspend the blockade.

A qualifying announcement must clearly and unambiguously identify the end or suspension of the blockade. Statements that merely allude to, reference, or describe an end to the blockade, without clearly communicating it, do not qualify. The announcement need not use specific terminology or reference the end of a blockade by name; an announcement of a resumption of prior obligations, the maintenance of a status quo, or a return to a previously agreed baseline qualifies, provided the substantive policy of ending or suspending the blockade is clearly and unambiguously communicated.

A qualifying announcement must be made through official channels, by an individual acting in an official capacity. Statements made incidentally or informally in a context not intended for official communication do not qualify.

The following do not qualify:

Anonymous, unattributed, or leaked statements not confirmed as official;
Statements by persons not authorized to speak for the United States government;
Third-party speculation, analysis, or predictions that the United States government will announce or implement an end to the blockade;
Satirical, fabricated, hacked, or impersonated communications; and
Statements that describe a prospective, contingent, probable, or conditional end to the blockade rather than announcing a present and decided position.

Once a qualifying announcement is made, this market will resolve to “Yes” regardless of whether it is later reversed, or whether the blockade actually ends in practice.

Resolution will be based on official information from the United States government, including the President, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and United States Central Command (CENTCOM), or the official representatives of the United States government.


3月31日

12月31日

米国がイランの封鎖解除を発表... ？

This market will resolve to "Yes" if a state of ceasefire remains in effect between Israel and Iran through the listed date, 11:59 PM Iran Standard Time (IRST). Otherwise this market will resolve to “No”. 

A state of ceasefire will be considered to no longer be in effect between Israel and Iran if either Israel or Iran takes a qualifying military action against the other country between market creation and the listed date, 11:59 PM IRST.

A qualifying military action refers to an air strike or a surface-to-surface missile strike, initiated by Israel or Iran, that directly impacts the other country. An air strike includes bombs, air-to-surface missiles, and air-launched drones. A surface-to-surface missile strike includes one-way attack drones and surface-to-surface missiles such as cruise or ballistic missiles.

The following actions do not constitute a qualifying military action:
Munitions destroyed or intercepted before impact;
Surface-to-air missile strikes;
Small-arms fire;
Ground incursions;
Cyber operations;
Naval gunfire and artillery fire;
Howitzers, artillery pieces, mortars, and rocket artillery (e.g. MLRS systems);
Minor surface-to-surface strikes, including short range loitering munitions, FPV drones, and ATGM strikes;
Any threat, authorization, or announcement of force that has not been executed.

Any munition that is intercepted or destroyed before impact does not constitute a qualifying military action. Debris, fragments, or any wreckage from intercepted munitions that land on Israel or Iran do not constitute a military action regardless of any damage incurred.

A military action will be considered to impact Israel or Iran if it directly impacts the terrestrial territory of Israel or Iran, including any internal waters. Maritime territory and airspace are not encompassed. Where territorial borders are disputed, all territory claimed by and under the de facto control of the relevant state as of market creation will qualify.

The occurrence, attribution, and timing of a qualifying military action will be primarily determined based on a consensus of information available from the resolution sources. Where multiple sources conflict regarding the occurrence, attribution, or timing of a relevant military action, this market will remain open until the earlier of: i) the confirmation of the occurrence, attribution, and timing of the action based on a consensus of information available from the resolution sources or ii) 3 full calendar days (IRST) from the date of the first credibly reported evidence of the action. If this period would extend past the end date, this market will remain open to allow for 3 full calendar days to pass. If, at the end of the third calendar day, conflicting reports remain as to the occurrence, attribution, or timing of the action, this market will resolve based on the totality of information available from the resolution sources at that time. No single statement, denial, or presentation of evidence will govern where it is contradicted by the totality of information.

The resolution sources for this market will be official information from the governments and militaries of Israel and Iran and credible reporting.

11月6日

11月7日

イスラエルとイランの停戦が続く... ？

Legislative elections are schedule to be held in Israel on October 27, 2026. 

This market will resolve to the next individual who is officially appointed and sworn in as Prime Minister of Israel following the 2026 parliamentary election. If an election is called early, this market will immediately resolve to the individual who is officially appointed and sworn in after that election.

To count for resolution, the individual must be formally sworn in. Any interim or caretaker Prime Minister will not count toward the resolution of this market.

If no such Prime Minister is sworn in by December 31, 2027, 11:59 PM ET, this market will resolve to “Other”.

The primary resolution source for this market will be official information from the Government of Israel; however, a consensus of credible reporting may also be used.

ガディ・アイゼンコット

ベンヤミン・ネタニヤフ

次の選挙後のイスラエルの首相は？

The next French presidential election is currently expected to be held around April 2027.  This market pertains to the outcome of the next French presidential election, regardless of whether it follows the scheduled end of the current term or is held earlier. 

The President of France is elected via a two-round system; a candidate must secure over 50% of the vote to win outright in the first round. If no candidate achieves this, the top two contenders advance to a runoff.

This market will resolve according to the candidate who wins this election.

This market includes any potential second round. If, for any reason, the results of the election are not known by December 31, 2027, 11:59 PM ET, this market will resolve to "Other".

This market will resolve based on the result of the election as indicated by a consensus of credible reporting. If there is ambiguity, this market will resolve based solely on the official results as reported by the French Government, specifically the Ministry of the Interior (https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/).

マリーヌ・ル・ペン

ダヴィッド・リスナール

次回のフランス大統領選挙

This market will resolve to “Yes” if Iran initiates a general closure of its airspace, that is not solely due to weather conditions, between market creation and the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.

A “general closure” refers to a cancellation or suspension of aviation which is generally applicable to all commercial flights transiting Iranian airspace (“Tehran FIR”). A qualifying closure must apply generally to all of Iran or the Tehran FIR; limited cancellations, delays, or partial closures will not qualify. A closure which applies generally to commercial aviation across Iranian airspace, with limited exceptions for certain categories of flights, however, will qualify (e.g. exceptions for certain flights pre-approved by the Iranian Civil Aviation Authority may be permitted).

Qualifying previous examples include the February 28, 2026 total closure of Iranian airspace (https://www.iranintl.com/en/202602289115) and the January 2026 total closure of Iranian airspace except to international flights with express governmental permission (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-shuts-airspace-most-flights-flightradar24-says-2026-01-14/). Non-qualifying examples include the January 27, 2026 partial closure of Iranian airspace around the Strait of Hormuz (https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-issues-airspace-notice-for-military-drills-near-strait-of-hormuz/3812508), the April 2024 closure of Iran’s western airspace (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-airports-cancel-flights-until-monday-morning-2024-04-14/), and the January 25 - April 25, 2026 VFR (Visual Flight Rules) flights suspension which did not broadly close commercial aviation in Iran (https://www.intellinews.com/iran-suspends-general-aviation-and-vfr-flights-in-new-airspace-directive-421997/).

Warnings, No-Fly-Zones, or other flight restrictions imposed by airlines or countries other than Iran will not be sufficient for a “Yes” resolution.

Airspace closures which occur solely due to weather conditions, earthquakes, or volcanic eruptions, will not qualify.

The primary resolution sources for this market will be official information from Iranian aviation authorities and a consensus of credible reporting.

11月30日

イランの完全な領空閉鎖は... ？

This market will resolve to "Yes" if the United States commences a military offensive intended to establish control over any portion of Iran by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".

For the purposes of this market, land de facto controlled by Iran or the United States as of November 4, 2025 12:00 PM ET, will be considered the sovereign territory of that country.

The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible sources.

Will the U.S. invade Iran before 2027?

米国は2027年までにイランを侵略するだろうか？

This market will resolve to "Yes" if the Supreme Leader of Iran, Mojtaba Khamenei, ceases to be the de facto leader of Iran at any point between market creation and the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".

Mojtaba Khamenei will be considered to no longer be the de facto leader of Iran if he is removed from power, is detained, or otherwise loses his position or is prevented from acting as the de facto leader of Iran within this market's timeframe.

An official announcement of Mojtaba Khamenei’s resignation or removal will qualify for a "Yes" resolution regardless of when the announced departure goes into effect.

The primary resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting. 

2027年6月30日

イランの指導部は... ？

This market will resolve to “Yes” if the named individual wins and accepts the 2028 nomination of the Republican Party for U.S. president. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.

The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of official Republican Party sources.

Any replacement of the Republican nominee before election day will not change the resolution of the market.

J.D.バンス

マルコ・ルビオ

2028年共和党大統領候補

This market will resolve to the individual who officially holds the position of the head of state of Venezuela on Dec 31, 2026 at 12 PM ET.

For the purposes of this market, "officially holds" refers to the individual that was formally appointed, confirmed (if confirmation is required), and sworn in as the head of state of Venezuela or otherwise confirmed by official government information as being the head of state of Venezuela. 

If the Venezuelan government does not clearly state who is the head of state, the market will resolve to the individual who is listed as the Head of State by the UN (see: https://www.un.org/dgacm/en/content/protocol/hshgnfa).  

In the event that more than one official head of state is listed by the Venezuelan  government, this market will resolve to the individual who is listed as having primary status. If no distinction is made, the market will resolve to the individual who first assumed the position. 

If no individual holds the position this market will resolve to “No Head of State”. 

The following do NOT constitute "officially holding" the role: nominated, announced, or designated as the head of state of Venezuela but appointment not yet effective; appointed with an effective date after Dec 31, 2026; previously served as the head of state of Venezuela but term has expired, resigned, or been terminated before Dec 31, 2026; serving as the head of state of Venezuela in a consultant, contractor, or unofficial capacity; named as successor or heir apparent to the head of state of Venezuela but not yet appointed; or holding a different role with oversight of the head of state of Venezuela but not the specified position itself.

The primary resolution source will be official information from the UN recognized government of Venezuela. If the Government of Venezuela does not clearly state who is the head of state, information from the UN and a consensus of credible reporting may be used. 

Note: this market is mutually exclusive. 


ニコラス・マドゥロ

デルシー・ロドリゲス

ベネズエラの指導者は2026年末？

On June 14, 2026, the United States and Iran announced a written diplomatic agreement, including a 60-day extendable period in which both countries committed to negotiate toward a “final deal” regarding Iran’s nuclear program and other topics.

This market resolves to “Yes” if a qualifying written diplomatic instrument between the United States and Iran has been mutually signed or adopted by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market resolves to “No.”

Unless the written instrument is formally adopted without signature as described below, the instrument must be signed by both the United States and Iran. Both parties must either sign the same document or sign individual documents that substantively and directly indicate acceptance of the same underlying instrument, regardless of minor formatting, wording, or translation differences between the signed versions. Both physical signatures and officially-issued electronic signatures will qualify as signatures.

If the written instrument is recognized by the United States and Iran as not requiring signature for execution, formal adoption of the instrument by both countries without signature will qualify. Formal adoption may be established by official actions, including:

(i) an official joint statement announcing that the United States and Iran have adopted, approved, executed, concluded, or otherwise finalized the instrument;
(ii) mutual official confirmation that the same published instrument has been agreed to, adopted, approved, executed, or concluded by both countries;
(iii) adoption, approval, or endorsement through an official resolution, ministerial decision, executive decision, or equivalent institutional act, where that act is the mechanism by which the relevant country adopts the instrument; or
(iv) an exchange of official diplomatic notes or letters confirming acceptance of the same instrument.

A qualifying written diplomatic instrument must:

(i) Be identified as the final deal contemplated by the June 14, 2026, memorandum of understanding, either in official United States or Iranian communications, or by a consensus of credible reporting;
(ii) Establish at least one specific obligation limiting Iran's nuclear program through a concrete, measurable benchmark against which compliance could be tested, which may take the form of a defined limit, prohibition, or quantity (e.g., a specific cap on the purity level to which Iran may enrich uranium, or an explicit commitment for Iran to surrender, destroy, or dilute its enriched uranium stockpile). Non-specific or vague restrictions, with no defined metric (e.g., a pledge not to pursue nuclear weapons, a commitment to maintain the status quo, or an agreement to abide IAEA monitoring or inspections requirements that do not specifically restrict Iran’s nuclear program) will not qualify.

The content of the qualifying instrument must be expressed as an agreed obligation to be implemented. The following do not qualify: 

(i) a provision the substantive obligation of which remains explicitly subject to a future agreement, negotiation process, or mutually agreed follow-on instrument; 
(ii) a provision explicitly framed as a minimum requirement for a future negotiation, rather than a present obligation; 
(iii) a floor, placeholder, or minimum standard established explicitly for the purpose of structuring ongoing or future talks. 

A definite and unconditional obligation may qualify, even if technical or procedural details, including the exact implementation date, timeframe, or sequencing, remain subject to future arrangements, provided that the obligation still establishes a concrete, measurable benchmark against which compliance could be tested. Conditional obligations do not qualify.

Whether an instrument qualifies will be primarily determined by its officially released text. A qualifying instrument must be signed or formally adopted by both the United States and Iran by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. If such an instrument is signed or formally adopted by that time, but the complete text has not been released, and genuine material ambiguity remains as to whether it satisfies this market’s requirements, this market may remain open for up to 28 calendar days after the specified date pending release of the text. If the text has still not been released after 28 calendar days, official and definitive announcements from the United States or Iran, and a consensus of credible reporting, will be used to determine whether the instrument qualifies.

An instrument to which parties other than the United States and Iran are also party will qualify, provided that both the United States and Iran are parties to the instrument and all other requirements are satisfied. 

Once a diplomatic instrument has been signed or formally adopted without signature by both the United States and Iran and confirmed to satisfy the requirements of a qualifying written diplomatic instrument, this market’s condition is met, regardless of whether the instrument later enters into force, is ratified, receives legislative or treaty consent, or is subsequently repudiated, withdrawn from, or not implemented by the United States or Iran.

The primary resolution sources for this market will be official communications from the governments of the United States and Iran, or their authorized representatives. A consensus of credible reporting from major news agencies of record may also be used.

米国とイランの最終核合意は… ？

This market resolves to “Yes” if the Iranian government officially announces and begins collecting fees, tolls, charges, tariffs, or similar payments from commercial vessels which are mandatory for passage through or access to the Strait of Hormuz between market creation and the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market resolves to “No.”

A qualifying fee must be an announced policy which applies generally to all commercial vessels, or a defined subcategory of commercial vessels (e.g., vessels flagged to the US and its allies). Isolated demanded charges will not qualify.

A fee is mandatory if, in practice, affected commercial vessels cannot transit or access the Strait of Hormuz without paying it, regardless of whether Iran characterizes the payment as voluntary or a fee for services. Fees described as tolls, maritime fees, service charges, environmental fees, security fees, insurance charges, etc. will qualify provided they are recognized as mandatory for passage through or access to the Strait of Hormuz by a consensus of credible reporting (e.g., a mandatory insurance fee charged by the Iranian Persian Gulf Strait Authority would qualify).

Both of the following are required to occur prior to the specified date, 11:59 PM ET to satisfy this market’s resolution criteria:
1) An official announcement from the Iranian government that such a fee is being, or will be, implemented.
2) A consensus of credible reporting that collection of the fee has begun.

Fees charged by Oman, the United Arab Emirates, shipping insurers, private companies, or other non-Iranian entities do not qualify unless charged jointly with Iran, or if Iran directly receives the fee or controls the charging entity. Normal port fees, customs duties, sanctions-related costs, or shipping surcharges do not alone qualify. 

The resolution sources will be official announcements from the government of Iran and consensus of credible reporting.

7月15日

イランはホルムズの料金を... ？

This market will resolve to "Yes" if there is a military encounter between the military forces of a NATO country and Russia between September 23 and December 31, 2025, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".

A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between NATO and Russian military forces. Non-violent actions, such as airspace violations, firing of warning shots (such as the June, 2021 Black Sea Confrontations between Russian forces and HMS Defender), or cyberattacks will not qualify.

Interception of missiles or other one-way attack or loitering munitions (e.g. Shahed drones) which are targeting a 3rd party other than the listed countries or their respective forces will not alone qualify. Shooting down UAVs which are not munitions (e.g. MQ-9, Orlan 10, Orion, Bayraktar TB2, etc.) will qualify.

Intentional physical collisions, including aerial interceptions and naval ramming without the direct use of weaponry, such as the 2023 Black Sea incident—where a Russian Su-27 damaged a U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drone's propeller, leading to its crash— will not qualify regardless of damage.

Military contractors will qualify only if confirmed to be operating under the direct command or coordination of the respective state’s armed forces (e.g. the Battle of Khasham would not qualify).

The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.

政治